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Abstract
Due to its distributed and open nature, Web Services give rise to new security challenges. This technology
is susceptible to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) attack, which takes advantage of existing vulnerabilities. The
proposed approach makes use of two Security Testing techniques, namely Penetration Testing and Fault
Injection, in order to emulate XSS attack against Web Services. This technology, combined with WS-
Security (WSS) and Security Tokens, can identify the sender and guarantee the legitimate access control to
the SOAP messages exchanged. We use the vulnerability scanner soapUI that is one of the most recognized
tools of Penetration Testing. In contrast, WSInject is a new fault injection tool, which introduces faults or
errors on Web Services to analyze the behavior in an environment not robust. The results show that the
use of WSInject, in comparison to soapUI, improves the detection of vulnerability allows to emulate XSS
attack and generates new types of them.
Keywords: web services; cross-site scripting; XSS attack; penetration testing; fault injection;
WS-Security; WSS; Security Token; soapUI; WSInject
1 Introduction
Web Services are modular software applications that can be described, published,
located, and invoked across a network, such as the World Wide Web [1]. Because
of its distributed and open nature, they are more susceptible to security risks [2].
Beyond the traditional insecurities, new ones arise, associated with technologies and
services such as SOAP and XML. One example is the so-called Injection Attacks,
among the most exploited in 2012, according to the Open Web Application Security
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Cross-site Scripting, better known as XSS, is a type of Injection Attack that
intercepts information provided by users. Its purpose is to store, modify, or delete
requests, misleading the servers and the user of the Web Services.
A variation of this attack allows to inject scripts (e.g. JavaScript, VBScript
or Flash Script) in Web Services through its parameters and operations described
in their WSDLs. The objective of the attacker is to inject malware 4 , modify the
database and infect every user who uses these Web Services.
Due to diﬃculty to ﬁnd vulnerabilities in Web Services like XSS, we apply a
Security Testing Methodology [4] in order to systematize the fault injection and
remove vulnerabilities in this software.
In our research, we analyze the robustness of Web Services using Security Testing
technique like Penetration Testing and Fault Injection. These techniques allow to
verify: i) vulnerabilities in Web applications and services against diﬀerent types of
security attacks such as Denial-of-Services or spooﬁng attacks; and ii) discover new
vulnerabilities before they are exploited by attackers [3]. Both techniques use tools
to analyze the presence of vulnerabilities in Web Services and emulate XSS attack.
We also analyze the robustness of Web services with WS-Security and Security
Tokens against XSS attack. These speciﬁcations allow to authorize the use of Web
Services through the authentication of users and others services.
Finally, this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the security chal-
lenges in Web services. Section 3 presents techniques for detecting vulnerabilities
in SOA. A Security Testing Methodology for Web Services is described in Section
4. Section 5 describes the approach and experimental study. Section 6 concludes
the research, emphasizing its main contributions and showing future works.
2 Security Challeges in Web Services
Security is a quality of system that ensures the absence of manipulation or unau-
thorized access to the system state [5]. The security threats take place due to
exploitation of vulnerabilities, during system development. There are numerous
causes of vulnerabilities, among which we can mention the complexity of systems,
and the lack of a mechanism to check the inputs provided. An attack that exploits
the vulnerabilities, maliciously or not, may compromise the security properties. The
result of a successful attack is an intrusion to the system. Figure 1 illustrates these
concepts.
2.1 Vulnerabilities in Web Services
Under the concept of Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), Web Services are in con-
stant communication with other services. Their clients make requests for services
through of a communication channel such as the Internet, sending and receiving in-
formation simultaneously. Another beneﬁt is the possibility to develop web services
4 Malware is a malicious software used by attackers to disrupt computer operation, gather sensitive infor-
mation, or gain access to private computer systems. Malware includes computer viruses, worms, Trojan
horses, among others.
M.I.P. Salas, E. Martins / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 302 (2014) 133–154134
Fig. 1. Security threats.
in diﬀerent languages and platforms. This technology transmits their information
using two protocols, XML and HTML.
In [2], the author deﬁnes the main challenges related to standards and inter-
operability in Web Services. This research emphasizes the relative immaturity of
this technology on security threats, quality of service (QoS), and scalability, among
others. In [6], the authors classify the security challenges involving threats, attacks
and security problems in this technology. We describe them as follows:
• Services level threats describe: attacks against WSDL and UDDI, injection of
malicious code, phishing, denial of service, spooﬁng XML schemas and kidnap-
ping/stealing session.
• Message level threats describe: injection attacks, forwarding messages, attacks of
message validation, interception and loss of message conﬁdentiality.
2.2 Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
This attack (c.f. § 1) inject malicious code, usually written in JavaScript through
the operations or parameters described in the WSDL of the target. XSS can be
used to steal sensitive information, hijack user sessions, and compromise the server,
attacking the integrity of the system [3].
Given the established trust relationship between Web Service and server, the
ﬁrst assumes that the code received is legitimate and therefore allows access to
conﬁdential information such as the session identiﬁer. Then, a malicious user can
hijack the session and gather information from people who use the Web Services or
the server [7]. This vulnerability occurs when a web application does not validate the
information received from external entities (users or other applications) and include
this information in databases and dynamically generated pages. For example, in
Figure 2 the server receives requests that are stored on the server, targeted for
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attack.
Fig. 2. XML form with user information.
A Web Service that does not validate the information, allows the attacker to
send the following comment, described in Figure 3:
Fig. 3. Server redirects users to a phishing site.
The JavaScript, described in Figure 3, injects two objects (windows.open and
windows.location) to send users to the site http://hackers.com/XSS_Ok/. This
type of attack is usually used in spam attacks, allowing to generate much more
harmful variations, i.e. record keyboard input and send the collected information
to the server of the attacker to ﬁlter passwords and private information of users
who use the Web Service infected. The interested reader can consult [19] and [20]
for a more complete introduction on the subject.
2.3 Security in Web Services
Every day, new vulnerabilities are found and new attacks are developed. This way,
the W3C 5 has developed various speciﬁcations to protect Web Services. The ﬁrst
speciﬁcation proposed for Web Services was WS-Security (WSS) in 2004. WS-
Security speciﬁes how integrity and conﬁdentiality can be enforced on messages and
allows the communication of various security tokens, such as SAML, Kerberos and
X.509. Its main focus is the use of XML Signature and XML Encryption to provide
end-to-end security [2].
XML Signature 9 deﬁne rules to generate and validate digital signatures ex-
pressed in XML to protect the integrity of the SOAP Message. XML encryption
[10] speciﬁes the encryption process for any type of data and its XML representa-
tion to protect the conﬁdentiality of the SOAP message. Finally, Security Token
5 The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is an international community that develops open standards
to ensure the long-term growth of the Web. Access to http://www.w3.org.
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[11] authenticates the client through the use of security credentials in the SOAP
message.
These speciﬁcations can be implemented partially or fully in the SOAP message,
allowing multiple users to encrypt and sign parts of the message, providing greater
security in communication end-to-end [1]. In Figure 4, we show the stack of WS-
Security speciﬁcations.
Fig. 4. Stack of WS-Security.
Because our interest is in the WS-Security and Security Tokens, the reader can
ﬁnd in [2] and [8] about the other speciﬁcations.
2.4 Security Tokens in Web Services
Security Token is a security speciﬁcation to verify authentication and authoriza-
tion in Web Services, in order to determine the identity of the user, along with
their access rights to the services. Represented in the SOAP message by the tag
<wsse:SecurityToken>, provides three types of security tokens such as Username
Token, based on X.509 certiﬁcate and Kerberos Security Token [2], [11]. Its basic
syntax is detailed in Figure 5.
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Fig. 5. Request of SOAP message with Username Token.
In Figure 5, we describe the use of Security Tokens. First, insert the tag
<wsse:Security> to use one security speciﬁcation, in this case Uername Token. Web
Service can contain more than one tag <wsse:Security> to insert more security spec-
iﬁcations (XML Encryption and XML Signature). Within the tag <wsse:Security>
we use the tag <role> that speciﬁes the privileges for a speciﬁc user. The tag
<role> can not be repeated or omitted because it would allow access for any users
to modify the SOAP message.
Fig. 6. Elements of the Tag <UsernameToken> [11].
The tag <wsse:UsernameToken> allows us to: i) conﬁrm the identity of the
request; ii) access to the services provider and the Web Service; and iii) identify the
service provider. In lines 6 and 7 (Figure 5), the Web Service recipient is informed
that the user has been authenticated and sent a request. In Figure 6 we describe
the elements that Username Token uses to provide the users identity.
3 Vulnerabilities Detection Techniques
Following the best practices of software testing and standards, there have been
developed a lot of tools, languages and techniques in order to analyze and detect
vulnerabilities in systems [5]. The security validation for Web Services can be
performed in two phases, static and dynamic phase.
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The static phase tries to ﬁnd faults inserted during the development phase in-
troduced in the code by possible human errors in the project stage. This phase is
analyzed as a state not reachable, i.e. it can always be found new faults. In this
case, the methods used are Static Analyze (code inspection, static vulnerability
analysis) or Theorem Proof, which do not need to run the system. These methods
are early detection and carry many beneﬁts such as reduced cost of testing.
On the other hand, the dynamic phase focuses on veriﬁcation of the system
during its running, i.e. the code of the system is tested with real entries to verify
security mechanisms at runtime. The Security Testing are applied in this phase.
This test looks for vulnerabilities in web applications by sending attack within
request message. Among these security techniques, we have the Penetration Testing
and Fault Injection.
Penetration Testing emulate attacks, in order to reveal vulnerabilities. The
tests are automated by the use of tools called vulnerability scanner (VS). There
are a variety of vulnerabilities scanners, both commercial (e.g. HP Web Inspect,
IBM Rational AppScan) and open source (e.g. WSDigger and WebScarab). The
vulnerabilities detected diﬀer from one tool to another. An evaluation [14] of several
commercial versions of vulnerabilities scanners showed that these tools are primarily
limited to low coverage of existing vulnerabilities and the high percentage of false
positives.
3.1 Fault Injection Technique
Fault Injection is a technique that can be used to assess aspects of dependability of
computing systems and can be implemented in hardware or software. This technique
emulates errors, failures or anomalies in the target system and observes its behavior
under a stressful environment. Fault injection dates back to 1970 when it was used to
induce hardware faults. This technique can be used to validate fault tolerant system,
assisting in the removal and prevention of faults while minimizing its occurrence and
severity [14], [15].
Our aim is using Fault Injection to insert software faults and analyze the behavior
of Web Services in a non-robust environment. There are several ways to inject faults
into a system. The most attractive, from the point of view of implementation cost, is
the fault injection in software. In this case, the faults are introduced by an injector,
which is a software responsible for inject faults in the system, either before or during
the run. In this technique, the tests consist of two input sets: the workload and the
faultload. The ﬁrst represent the usual entry to the system that serves to activate
its functionality, while the latter represents the faults to be introduced.
Our approach compares two techniques to analyze the presence of vulnerabilities
in Web Services, through two tools, the vulnerability scanner soapUI and the fault
injector WSInject. These tools emulated the XSS attack to analyze the exchange
of security messages between Web Services and their clients, in order to obtain: i)
higher coverage of attacks, and ii) lower number of false positives. With respect
to i) the use of WSInject, compared to soapUI, allows to emulate various types of
attacks, varying the parameters and data including the Fuzz Testing technique and
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Penetration Testing technique. In ii) we use a set of rules (Section V.B), based on
multiple sources to improve the detection of vulnerabilities in Web Services.
3.2 Related Work
There are numerous works in the literature suggesting the use of Fault Injection
and Penetration Testing techniques to test the security in applications: In [13], this
technique was applied to test a security protocol used for communication of mobile
devices on the Internet. In [3] and [18] the authors use perturbations in the SOAP
messages for emulating attacks, similar to our proposal. These studies use injectors
that emulate a type of attack, while ours is for general purpose, i.e. our injector
emulates diﬀerent types of attacks and allows to generate combinations of them.
In this research, we did not ﬁnd studies directly related but rather works that
analyze the following aspects: 1) Security Testing; 2) tools with open source; 3)
portable tools; 4) robustness analysis of the tested services; and 5) robustness anal-
ysis of WS-Security. Table 1 presents a summary of the main approaches related to
our research.
As can be seen in Table 1, there is no research that examines the robustness
of Web Services and WS-Security against XSS attacks, using Security Testing with
open and portable tools.
4 Security Testing Methodology for Web Services
One of the challenges to ﬁnd vulnerabilities in Web Services during the imple-
mentation phase is determine which attacks scenarios are appropriate to test for.
These scenarios can be obtained from various sources such as Internet, books and
papers. However, it is hard to ﬁnd and set up a database with relevant attacks and
automating them according to the testing environment. Our purpose in this section
is to use, in part, the Security Testing Methodology [4] whit the approach described
in Figure 7.
In the following sub-sections, we brieﬂy describe the results of each phase of
the implementation of the Security Testing Methodology with XSS. This attack is
emulated with WSInject and soapUI. The reader who wishes to know more about
this methodology should look at [4] and [35].
4.1 Identiﬁcation of the Attacker Objectives
To identify the objectives of the attacker was necessary to make a research on
vulnerabilities in web services, with the aim of gathering information about XSS. For
this, we decided to search in articles [1], [2], [7], [41] and standards [8] that present
vulnerabilities in the context of Web Services. While some of the vulnerabilities are
caused by shortcomings in the implementation, most of them explore basic faults
of the protocol, i.e. abusing of the ﬂexibility of SOAP.
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Table 1
Characteristics of Approaches and Tools in Web Services Researches
Approaches/Tools 1) 2) 3) 4) 5)
WebScarab [20]    
Wsrbench [21]  
HPLoadRunner [22]  
CDLChecker [23]   
WS-Diamond [24]   
IDEA Volcano [25]  
H-Fuzzing [26]  
SQL Fuzzing [27]    
RV4WS [28]   
Seo - IDS [29]  
WS-TAXI [30]    
SoapUI [7], [30]    
TCP App [31], [32]    
VS.WS [33]   
HP WebInspect [13]   
IBM Rational [13]   
Acunetix WVS [13]   
WSInject [34]    
4.2 Deﬁnition of the Attacker Capability
Based on the Dolev-Yao model [36], we consider that the attacker has the following
capabilities:
• Partial control of the network and ability to capture the SOAP messages.
• Ability to intercept and modify strings or expressions, delay or replicate message
traﬃc.
• Knowledge of the status of all participants, i.e. the attacker intercepts messages
and supplants client/server or just works as a mediator of communication between
the client and the server (man in the middle attack).
• The attacker can recognize the access points, operations and parameters of WSDL
M.I.P. Salas, E. Martins / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 302 (2014) 133–154 141
Fig. 7. Steps to use the Security Testing Methodology [4].
in the Web Service tested.
4.3 Attacks Modeling
In this step, we use the SecurITree version 3.4 [37] in order to model XSS attack.
This tool, used in several researches [4], [38] helped us to design the attack tree for
injecting vulnerabilities in Web Services.
Our attack tree was built and structured accordingly to the proposed steps in
[35], composed of the following attributes: i) attacker capability; ii) possibility of
emulating the attack by a fault injection tool; iii) the requirements of the attack to
be run in the Web Service; and iv) the veriﬁcation if the WS-Security protects the
Web Services from XSS attack.
Fig. 8. Attack tree in text notation for Web Services and WS-Security.
These four attributes were used to classify the Injection Attacks with boolean
values, namely <Possible, Impossible>. The output is the creation of the attack
tree, which is used by the attacker to look for vulnerabilities in the Web Services,
as described in Figure 8.
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4.4 Attack Scenarios Generation
At this stage, the attack scenarios are produced automatically according to the
criteria deﬁned in Section IV.C of [35]. The output of this step is the attack scenarios
described in the same format of the tree leaves, each one representing the description
of an attack.
The scenarios can be used to create a useful and reusable library of attacks to
test protocols [4]. In Figure 9, it is described an attack scenario of XSS using the
information gotten from [38] about the attack operation.
Fig. 9. XSS attack pattern.
4.5 Attack Scenarios Implementation
The attack scenarios, generated in step 4 (section IV.D), are described in text no-
tation, i.e. at the same level of the attack tree abstraction. This type of description
is useful for testing analysts and security experts due to their easy conﬁguration,
but not to be processed by an injection tool.
In this stage, the analysts must perform a set of reﬁnement steps in order to
transform the text notation into executable script by WSInject tool as showed in
Figure 10.
Fig. 10. Execuble attack script to emulate XSS with WSInject.
5 Proposed Approach
This section applies the Security Testing Methodology through two techniques, Pen-
etration Testing and Fault Injection. Both techniques emulate the XSS attack.
Also, are selected 10 Web Services from a set of 22,272, obtained from UBR
(Universal Business Registry) Seekda, 5 of which use the WS-Security with Security
Token, the others do not. These services have properties required to reproduce the
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attack as authentication operations (c.f. § 4.4) and use of WS-Security with Security
Tokens (c.f. § 2.3).
5.1 Penetration Testing with soapUI
At this stage, we identify the behavior of Web services in presence of XSS attacks,
tested by vulnerability scanner soapUI. The tool injects scripts through the add-on
Security Testing and analyzes the response from servers, classifying the responses
in Web Services, vulnerable or not, by the injection of XSS attack. For this, we
installed the soapUI version 4.5 with the add-on Security Testing on a laptop with
operating system (OS) Windows 7, CPU Intel Core2 Duo 2.00GHz and 3.00GB
RAM.
We use client-server architecture, described in Figure 11, which injects a set
of malicious requests to Web Services by the add-on Security Testing [8]. Our
objective was to: i) provoke a non-robust behavior in services, ii) identify potential
security vulnerabilities, and iii) notify administrators of potential vulnerabilities of
Web Services.
Fig. 11. Test Architecture.
All the requests made to the 10 Web Services returned responses. In general,
were recorded 2,526 responses by the emulation of XSS with soapUI. This tool
classiﬁed as “alerts or possible vulnerabilities found”to 55.54% (1403 responses)
and 44.46% (1123 responses) were classiﬁed “no alerts or vulnerabilities found”.
5.2 Analysis of Vulnerabilities in Web Services
An important aspect of this step is to identify when a vulnerability was eﬀectively
detected, excluding potential false positives. It is also necessary to diﬀerentiate
when a result is invalid due to an internal failure of the server (unintentional) or is
a consequence of a successful attack.
Given the black box approach, we analyze the logs stored by soapUI. The logs
contain requests made by the add-on Security Testing and responses sent by the
server. Each response was analyzed by the assertions preconﬁgured in the add-
on Security Testing for XSS attacks. In Figure 12 describes the log produced by
this tool. As can be seen in lines 7-13 of the response, the attack found sensitive
information (route directory, programming languages, database type, etc.) that can
be used for an attack. This procedure was repeated for 2,526 logs.
There are several ways to analyze the existence of vulnerabilities in SOA (Service
Oriented Architecture) [19], e.g. compare server responses in the presence of attacks
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Fig. 12. Log generated by the add-on Security Testing, by the injection of XSS attack.
and absence of them, sensitive information exposure, XML schema modiﬁcation
request, among others. This step is crucial to reduce the number of false positives
or false negatives.
Our approach uses the HTTP status-code in the server response, which describes
the behavior of the Web Service in a not robust environment. For example, when
the request is processed by Web Services without detecting the attack, i.e. not
generated a message describing the existence of error in the request, it allows to
identify the existence of a possible vulnerability found with code 200 OK. If a code
400 Bad Request is received, we consider a robust response because the server
detected the XSS attack.
In case of code 500 Internal Server Error, we analyze the server response using
<soap:Fault> tag inside the body of the SOAP message, which provides errors and
status information of the SOAP message containing the sub-elements:
• <faultcode> Fault code identiﬁcation.
• <faultstring> Descriptive explanation of the fault.
• <faultactor> Information about what or who caused the fault to happen.
• <details> Information that describes the server error.
Furthermore, the values of fault code can be classiﬁed into four types:
• VersionMismatch: The server encountered an invalid namespace in the SOAP
message envelope.
• MustUnderstand: absence of a required element in the SOAP message header.
• Client: The message sent was structured incorrectly or contains incorrect infor-
mation for authentication.
• Server: There was an issue with the server so that the message cannot be pro-
cessed.
Based on the results of Penetration Testing phase (c.f. § 3.2) and interpretation
of the HTTP status code in the header of the SOAP message response, we developed
8 rules to determine the existence of vulnerabilities in Web Services, described below.
Rule 1. If the header contains the code “200 OK”AND the server ran the
SOAP message with the XSS attack, THEN there is a Vulnerability Found (VF)
in the Web Service. OTHERWISE, if the SOAP message describes the existence
of a syntax error or warning about the presence of an attack, THEN there is No
Vulnerability Found (NVF) in the Web Service.
Rule 2. If the header contains the code “400 Bad request message”, e.g. re-
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quest format is invalid: missing required soap: Body element, THEN there is No
Vulnerability Found (NVF) in the Web Service.
Rule 3. If the header contains the code “500 Internal Server Error”AND there
was information disclosure in the SOAP message (e.g. it shows information of path
directory, functions library and objects, access to database and XML ﬁles with
usernames and passwords, among others), THEN there is a Vulnerability Found
(VF), OTHERWISE there is No Vulnerability Found (NVF) in the Web Service.
Rule 4. i) If in the absence of attacks, the header contains the code “500
Internal Server Error”AND there was information disclosure in the SOAP message.
AND ii) if in the presence of XSS attack, the header contains the code “HTTP 200
OK”, THEN there is a Vulnerability Found (VF) in the Web Service.
Rule 5. i) If in the absence of attacks, the header contains the code “500
Internal Server Error”AND there was information disclosure in the SOAP message.
AND iii) if in the presence of XSS attack, the header contains the code “400 Bad
request message”, THEN there is a Vulnerability Found (VF) in the Web Service.
Rule 6. i) If in the absence of attacks, the header contains the code “500
Internal Server Error”AND there was information disclosure in the SOAP message.
AND iv) if in the presence of XSS attack, the header contains the code “500 Internal
Server Error”too, THEN there is a Vulnerability Found (VF) in the Web Service.
Rule 7. If the server does not respond, it is considered as crash, THEN the
result is considered Inconclusive, because cannot guarantee that the error was caused
by the attack.
Rule 8. If none of the rules above may be applied, THEN the result is considered
Inconclusive, because there is no way to conﬁrm if there really were vulnerabilities
in the Web Service.
The ease to apply the rules allows us to analyze quickly and accurately the
presence of vulnerabilities in Web Services by injecting XSS attack scripts in the
SOAP message. Rules 4, 5 and 6 analyze the response of Web Services, which in the
absence of XSS attack, presents the code “500 Internal Server Error”in the header.
However, when we send SOAP messages with the XSS attack, the Web Services
generates new responses, which are analyzed by the rules cited.
In rule 7, the XSS attack generates unavailability of the services (crash), sim-
ilar to Denial of Service attack (DoS). In this case, we classify the response as
inconclusive, because we cannot conclude whether the attack was responsible of the
unavailability of the service or the injection of XSS script was the cause of the server
failure.
Rule 8 is an exception to the rest of the rules, for the case in which none of
the other rules can classify the response classiﬁed as inconclusive. These rules are
described in Figure 13.
Applying the rules from Figure 13 to the results from Penetration Testing phase
(c.f. § 3.2), 15.99% (404) of the responses were classiﬁed as vulnerability found
and 39.55% (999) as false positive. Note that the false positives are the double as
vulnerabilities found. The results are described in Table 2.
The Web Services that use the Security Token speciﬁcation reduce their vulner-
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Fig. 13. Rules for analysis of vulnerabilities in web services.
abilities against XSS attacks, as shown in Figure 14.
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Table 2
Results from Penetration Testing phase
Web Services False Vulnerabilities False No Vulnera-
Positives Found Negatives bility Found
without WSS 274 328 336 576
% injected 18.10% 21.66% 22.19% 38.04%
with WSS 725 76 106 105
% injected 71.64% 7.51% 10.47% 10.38%
Total 999 404 442 681
% injected 39.55% 15.99% 17.50% 26.96%
Fig. 14. Applying the rules of vulnerability analysis in Penetration Testing phase.
5.3 Injection Faults with WSInject
The fault injector WSInject [21] allows to emulate XSS attacks in order to found
vulnerabilities in Web Services. This tool works as a proxy between the client
(Windows 7 SP 1, Intel Core 2 Duo 2.0 GHz and 3 GB RAM) and servers (c.f. §
3). The interception and modiﬁcation of SOAP messages exchange are transparent
between the client and servers. This way, WSInject does not need the source code of
the Web Services or interfere with the execution platform, allowing it to be used by
developers and users. It is suﬃcient to conﬁgure the client to connect to the target
(WSDL of the Web Services) via proxy. In this study, the fault injector intercepts
request messages sent by the client (soapUI), before being passed to the server, as
illustrated in Figure 15.
The fault injector use scripts in format of text ﬁles. These ones describe the
faults to be injected in Web Services, emulating attacks. The scripts are composed
by one or more FaultInjectionStatements. Each one is composed by a ConditionSet
and a FaultList. The FaultInjectionStatements work with commands of condition-
action type. When it intercepts a SOAP message and satisfy a set of condition, the
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Fig. 15. Tested architecture used with WSInject.
faults are injected into the message. Figure 16 shows a script example.
Fig. 16. Script example of the WSInject.
In bold we have the keywords that specify conditions and actions. The ﬁrst line
shows a condition and two actions. This line has a URI Condition. If the string
hotel is in URI message of the request or response, WSInject replace the string
name with age and duplicate the content in the message. In the second line, every
time a message is response and contains the string caught exception its content is
cleared.
To emulate the XSS attack, the user should recognize the operations described
in WSDL and intercept the soap message in order to corrupt these operations and
their parameters values.
To develop XSS scripts and their values to be emulated with the fault injector,
we use the information from the literature, as well as attacks produced by soapUI
with add-on Security Testing and the papers in [3], [4], [22]. Examples of scripts
generated are shown in Table 3. These scripts use the condition isRequest() to
ﬁlter the requests of responses. In each request, WSInject uses the stringCorrupt
action to replace the <per:PersonID> tag and the parameter admin by a XSS
attack, composed of a <per:PersonID> <SCRIPT”></SCRIPT> admin tag that
redirect the Web Services victim to the attackers Web Site to download the hello.jsp
JavaScript in the server. The attacker Web Site have a counter that records the
downloads.
5.4 Faultload Campaign with WSInject
An important aspect in testing of Web Services is the generation of network traﬃc
- the workload. It represents the requests that activate the target Web Service. To
make test more reliable, we generate traﬃc very close to the real ﬂow received by
a Web Service. We used the add-on Load Testing to generate the workload. This
tool represents the client, as shown in Figure 15. The traﬃc generated consists of
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Table 3
Scripts to emulate XSS attacks with Fault Injector WSInject
requests made to Web Services in order to emulate a real client making requests.
The faultload campaign had the following procedure. For each Web Service,
were developed 5 injection scripts, each one specifying a corruption of the value of a
particular parameter or operation, as shown in Table 3. The workload consisted of
sending 100 requests per injection script. In total, 5,000 attacks were carried out.
Figure 17 illustrates this campaign.
Fig. 17. Faultload campaign.
Given the large number of combinations of values (operations and parameters)
for all Web Services, it is infeasible to generate all combinations of attacks needed
to analyze all vulnerabilities in Web Services. For this reason, we chose to perform
only a subset of these experiments.
5.5 Evaluation of Fault Injection
An important aspect of this step is to identify when vulnerability was eﬀectively
detected, i.e. when an attack was successful, excluding false positives.
Given the black box proposed approach, we used as information sources in the
logs stored in tools (WSInject fault injector and soapUI load testing) that contain
the SOAP message (requests and response). Figure 18 shows an example of log
M.I.P. Salas, E. Martins / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 302 (2014) 133–154150
produced by WSInject, which the script of condition 2 changed the contents of the
tag <ser:sTripCode>YRT12 by a JavaScript called hello.jsp. In lines 5, 6, and 7
of the request, the Script 2 modiﬁes the SOAP message, making the Web Services
to download the hello.jsp JavaScript from the attacker server. In the response, the
Web Services process the script and return private information from the server. We
also observed that the SOAP request message return HTTP status code 500 Internal
Server Error. In this way, the Rule 3 of analysis of vulnerabilities is fulﬁlled (c.f.
§ 5.2) and we concluded that there are vulnerabilities in the Web Services for XSS
attack.
Fig. 18. Log generated by WSInject.
Based on this information, we apply the rules of vulnerability analysis in each
SOAP message (request and response) stored by WSInject and soapUI. This pro-
cedure also allows to detect vulnerabilities in Web Services with WS-Security and
Security Token.
The results of the injection attacks are described in Table 4. The application of
the Fault Injection technique with WSInject doubled the detection of XSS vulnera-
bilities of 15.99% to 39.28%, in comparison with the Penetration Testing technique
with soapUI with add-on Security Testing. Using WS-Security with Security Token
reduces the impact of XSS attack from 42.56% to 36.00% among 5 Web Services
using the security standard and the other 5 not.
Comparing the results in Table 2 and Table 4 by emulation of XSS attack with
Penetration Testing and Fault Injection techniques, we concluded that the second
technique improves the vulnerability detection of XSS attack in Web Services, and
the standard WS-Security partially protects Web Services to XSS attacks. The rest
of the results are shown in Figure 19.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we propose a new approach to analyze the robustness of Web Services
by Fault Injection with WSInject. This tool allows emulation and generation of
attacks, however, the process is delayed and often not automated. In this research,
we emulated the Cross-site Scripting (XSS) attack. This is a fairly frequent attack,
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Table 4
Results from Fault Injection phase
Web Services Total attacks Vulnerabilities Found No Vulnerability Found
without WSS 2,500 1,064 1,436
% injected 100% 42.56% 57.44%
with WSS 2,500 900 1,600
% injected 100% 36% 64%
Total 5,000 1,964 3,036
% injected 100% 39.28% 60.72%
Fig. 19. Faultload campaign.
according to the research cited, whose eﬀects can be quite devastating for servers
and users of Web Services.
The results of the Penetration Testing phase helped to develop the rules for
vulnerabilities analysis. However, the results obtained by soapUI show a large per-
centage of false positives and false negatives. We also veriﬁed the security provided
by WS-Security standard with the add-on Security Token against XSS attack. In
both phases, the use of WS-Security reduces signiﬁcantly the number of vulnerabil-
ities. However, this can be improved with the use of other speciﬁcations.
One advantage of the proposed approach is that it relies on the use of a fault in-
jector of general purpose, which can be used to emulate several types of attacks and
may generate variants of the same, which is usually limited in the tools commonly
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used for security testing, as the vulnerabilities scanners.
As future work, we plan to use variants of attacks to improve detection of new
vulnerabilities, always considering the service as a black box.
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